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Abstract 
This study examines the impact of Thailand’s 30 baht universal health scheme on household savings 
behavior using Thai Socio-economic Survey data from 2000, 2001, and 2004. Two 
difference-in-differences (DID) approaches are employed: first, a simple approach using the 
eligibility of all health schemes and second, a more rigorous approach exploiting the phased 
introduction of the 30 baht scheme. The results show that savings behavior changed after the scheme 
was introduced. Simple DID analysis shows that the propensity to save out of permanent income 
decreases from about 14%–17%, which accounts for 24–30% of the propensity to save out of 
permanent income in 2004. More rigorous DID analysis shows that the propensity to save out of 
permanent income is reduced immediately after the introduction of the scheme. This means that even 
poor households have greatly reduced levels of permanent consumption in order to prepare for 
unpredictable health risks. 
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1 Introduction 
 
In many developing countries, household health care expenditure is funded mainly by out-of-pocket 
payments because health insurance is rarely provided. Furthermore, out-of-pocket payments for 
health care can be large relative to total household expenditure because household income is low in 
these countries. If households are unprepared for sudden illnesses and cannot borrow to cover 
unexpected medical costs, they may have to sell assets or reduce living expenses in order to finance 
out-of-pocket payments. Even if households do not choose treatment for disease, their permanent 
income may possibly decrease via reduced human capital arising from disease. As a result, 
households fall into poverty or lose opportunities to escape poverty. To make matters worse, poor 
households have a greater tendency to fall ill than rich households (Case, 2004). 
Previous theoretical models show that households increase their savings when future consumption 
or future income becomes more uncertain (Kimball, 1990; Leland, 1968). In addition, an 
unpredictable disease affecting a family member is a factor of economic uncertainty. Hence, 
uninsured households have a precautionary motive to restrain consumption and to save. Conversely, 
the introduction of public health insurance for uninsured households can reduce the precautionary 
motive by reducing the risk of unexpected medical expenses. Some empirical studies analyze the 
relationship between health insurance and precautionary savings in developed countries. However, 
the empirical evidence is mixed on the relationship between savings behavior and insurance. 
The aim of this study is to assess the impact of Thailand’s universal health scheme, known as the 
30 baht scheme, on household savings behavior by using the Thai Socio-economic Survey (SES). 
The 30 baht scheme, which was introduced by the Thai government in four phases from April 2001 
to April 2002, guarantees comprehensive outpatient and inpatient care. Beneficiaries pay just 30 baht 
(approximately 0.75 USD in January 2004) per visit to a registered primary care unit1. Thus, the 
main purpose of the 30 baht scheme is to ensure that the whole Thai nation can access medical 
services cheaply and sufficiently. Somkotra and Lagrada (2008) show that the 30 baht scheme 
reduces the risk of catastrophic medical expenses. As a result, it could reduce the risk of unexpected 
medical expenses. However, the effect of the scheme on savings behavior is under-researched. 
In order to measure the impact of the 30 baht scheme on household savings, this study employs 
two difference-in-differences (DID) approaches. In the first approach, define a treatment group and a 
1 Beneficiaries who were eligible for the Medical Welfare Scheme (MWS, see Subsection 2.2) before the 
introduction of the 30 baht scheme were exempt from this payment. 
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control group are defined based on eligibility for the 30 baht scheme. This approach assumes that 
changing savings behavior over time is equal in both groups. On the other hand, in the second 
approach, the timing of the phased introduction of the scheme is exploited. This second approach 
allows us to estimate without the assumptions of the first DID approach. In employing these methods, 
I attempt to avoid the estimation results bias suffered by many similar previous studies. 
This study is one of the first in a developing country about the relationship between health 
insurance and precautionary savings. Even though the expected damage that poor households suffer 
from health risk is bigger than rich households, empirical studies in developing countries have been 
researched insufficiently. The 30 baht scheme, which is one of the first universal coverage health 
schemes in lower middle-income countries, allows us to study this theme. Furthermore, because the 
30 bath scheme has features as natural experiments, it is possible to avoid some empirical problems. 
The presented empirical results suggest that the 30 baht scheme has changed household savings 
behavior. Based on both DID approaches in analyses of treatment subgroups without the richest 
groups, the results show that the 30 baht scheme decreases precautionary savings. In detail, a 
comparison of saving behavior before and after the introduction of the 30 baht scheme using the 
simple DID approach shows the propensity to save out of permanent income decreases from about 
14 % – 17 %. This magnitude accounts for 24–30% of the propensity to save out of permanent 
income. Moreover, the results of the rigorous DID approach show that the propensity to save out of 
permanent income decreases statistically significantly in two treatment subgroups, even immediately 
after the introduction of the 30 baht scheme. These results imply that informal sector households 
prepare for their health risks, and the health risks lower the level of permanent consumption. That is, 
the 30 baht scheme improves the living standards of households but not richer households, in the 
informal sector. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the institutional setting and 
reviews previous studies of the relationship between health insurance and savings. Section 3 
describes the estimation strategy used in the present study. Section 4 provides an overview of the 
data set. Section 5 reports the estimation results and Section 6 discusses their robustness. Section 7 
concludes. 
 
2 Background 
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2.1 The 30 baht scheme’s place in Thailand’s health care schemes 
One of the goals of the 30 baht scheme is to remove the risk of catastrophic medical payments from 
the whole nation. If health risk can be removed, it is expected that households reduce precautionary 
saving for this risk. The purpose of this study is to examine this precautionary saving reduction. For 
our evaluation, we focus on the two settings, as natural experiments, of the introduction of the 30 
baht scheme. 
There are two natural experiment situations for the introduction of the 30 baht scheme. First, the 
beneficiaries of the 30 baht scheme were automatically registered on the scheme. Second, because 
the introduction of the 30 baht scheme was carried out in stages, the period of beneficiary enrollment 
in the 30 baht scheme can be regarded as random. Using these two features, we can avoid the 
empirical problem of the endogeneity of health insurance participation. 
The history of health insurance schemes in Thailand explains the reason why the 30 baht scheme 
has features as natural experiments. The government has aimed for universal coverage of public 
health insurance since the birth of the first Thai democratic government in 1973. Four medical 
schemes were introduced before the introduction of the 30 baht scheme. The first was the Medical 
Welfare Scheme (MWS), which was introduced in 1975 and aimed to provide free medical care to 
low-income households. However, this scheme suffered problems related to funding and targeting. 
The second scheme, the Civil Servant Medical Benefit Scheme (CSMBS), was introduced in 1978 to 
provide health benefits to civil servants and their dependents. Beneficiaries were free to choose 
private or public providers. The CSMBS remains as a superior health care scheme after the 
introduction of the 30 baht scheme. The third scheme, the Social Security Scheme (SSS), was 
introduced in 1990. The SSS can be used in both private and public hospitals but covers only formal 
sector employees (their families are excluded). The fourth scheme, the Voluntary Health Card 
Scheme (VHCS), was introduced in 1993 to cover those ineligible for any of the other schemes. 
However, there were concerns that the VHCS was not reaching its intended target population and 
suffered from a classic adverse selection problem because the purchase of health cards was not 
compulsory. In addition, 21% of nationals did not receive any medical schemes in 2001.  
The 30 baht scheme was introduced to solve the problem of the medical schemes for the informal 
sector, the MWS and the VHCS, and to provide health security for uninsured nationals. In other 
words, all Thais who were ineligible for the CSMBS and the SSS automatically became 
beneficiaries of the 30 baht scheme. Following its introduction in April 2002, its coverage spread 
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rapidly to 74.7% in 2003, from when the number of uninsured has gradually decreased (Table 1)2,3. 
In addition, the budget per person of the 30 baht scheme is larger than any previous scheme4. By 
using this feature, Gruber et al., (2013) show that the 30 baht scheme increased health care 
utilization and decreased infant mortality. Their results signify that informal sector households could 
not receive sufficient medical services even if they receive the MWS. 
The 30 baht scheme has influenced not only the coverage but also the medical expenses of 
households. Somkotra and Lagrada (2008) examine the financial implications of such payments 
using SES data, especially when payments exceed certain threshold values, such as the fraction of 
total household consumption or non-food consumption. Somkotra and Lagrada (2008) conclude that 
unexpected out-of-pocket payments for medical care decreased following the introduction of the 30 
baht scheme. This means that its introduction could automatically decrease the precautionary savings 
motive for the health risk of beneficiaries. 
The phased introduction of the 30 baht scheme can be regarded as an exogenous shock to 
household saving behavior. The 30 baht scheme was introduced nationwide from April 2002, having 
been introduced in four phases from April 2001. It was introduced in 6 provinces in the first phase of 
April 2001; 17 provinces in the second phase of July 2001; all remaining provinces, but not some 
areas in Bangkok in the third phase of October 2001; and in the remaining areas of Bangkok in the 
last phase of April 2002. Surprisingly, the socioeconomic background of households enrolled in the 
30 baht scheme in each stage is hardly statistically different. Moreover, the health care resources of 
each province are not significantly different5. That is, the introduction of the 30 baht scheme is 
considered as a natural experimental situation for household saving behavior. 
 
2.2 Precautionary savings and health insurance 
Some theoretical studies focus on the relationship between household savings and insurance (e.g., 
Hubbard et al., 1995). The precautionary motive diminishes if households join insurance schemes by 
lowering economic uncertainty. In addition, health insurance shrinks household precautionary 
savings in theory. Decreasing unexpected out-of-pocket medical expenses by joining the health 
2 It is important to note that it is rare for beneficiaries of the CSMBS and SSS change to the 30 baht scheme because 
the contents of health care security in the CSMBS and the SSS are richer than those in the 30 baht scheme. That is, 
the beneficiallies of the 30 baht scheme could not join the CSMBS or the SSS before the introduction. 
3 Although the 30 baht scheme is universal, 5% of nationals do not take it up. One of the reasons for this is that 
beneficiaries can use the program only in an area in which they are registered as residents. 
4 This scheme is financed almost solely from tax revenue and public hospitals are the main providers, covering more 
than 95% of beneficiaries (Wibulpolprasert and Thaiprayoon, 2008). 
5 See Table 3. 
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insurance reduce the precautionary savings motive (Kotlikoff, 1989). 
Some empirical studies confirm the theoretical conclusion. Levin (1995) finds that precautionary 
savings are made by many elderly households that do not have private health care insurance. Gruber 
and Yelowitz (1999) use panel data to assess the relationship between eligibility for the US social 
insurance program Medicaid and household savings behavior. They find that Medicaid eligibility has 
a significant positive effect on consumption expenditure. In other words, Medicaid eligibility has a 
negative effect on household savings. 
Few studies do not support the theory of precautionary savings. Starr-McCluer (1996) finds a 
positive correlation between health insurance and wealth holdings. Guariglia and Rossi (2004) 
investigate whether uninsured individuals tend to save more than insured individuals, but find that 
this hypothesis does not hold, even after controlling for the endogeneity of insurance purchases. 
Empirical evidence is mixed on theoretical predictions. 
These previous studies suffer from three empirical problems. First is the endogeneity of savings 
behavior and insurance purchases. For example, in the case of private insurance, a household’s 
preference to join a private insurance may be associated with savings behavior. A problem with this 
approach is that insurance status is an outcome of the same choice process that determines savings 
decisions (Gruber and Yelowitz, 1999). The second problem is peculiar to means-tested social 
insurance, such as Medicaid in the US. Hubbard et al. (1995) argue that asset-tested social insurance 
programs affect savings in two ways: one is that social insurance reduces the precautionary savings 
motive by decreasing unexpected out-of-pocket payments and the other is that social insurance 
reduces household savings in order to meet the eligibility criteria for asset-tested social insurance. 
Consequently, it is difficult to identify the effect on precautionary savings.  
Chou et al. (2003) avoid the first and the second empirical problems by focusing on the national 
health insurance (NHI) scheme that was introduced in 1995 in Taiwan, which is available to all 
nationals. This full availability means that we can identify the effect of the introduction of the NHI 
scheme on household savings without self-selection bias. They use the DID estimation strategy and 
define the control and treatment groups based on the eligibility of government insurance programs 
before the introduction of the NHI. They find that the introduction of the NHI reduces savings for 
treatment groups. However, this method could have caused the third problem, which is sample 
selection bias because the participants of health insurance do not assign randomly. 
Under the DID method, it is assumed that the treatment and control groups have the same time 
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trend. To satisfy this assumption, random assignment to each group is ideal. However, it is unlikely 
that the definition of each group in Chou et al. (2003) satisfies the DID assumption because the 
eligibility of health insurance before the introduction of the NHI is defined by the socioeconomic 
backgrounds of the population. Thus, the socioeconomic background of the new beneficiaries differs 
from that of the continuing beneficiaries. Because there is the possibility of sample selection, the 
estimation results may have been biased. 
In this study, the 30 baht scheme can avoid these issues because it has rare features. However, the 
new beneficiaries are not selected randomly, like in Chou et al. (2003). Accordingly, the first DID 
approach in this study could face potential bias caused by this third problem. On the other hand, we 
can assume that the phased introduction of the 30 baht scheme is exogenous to household saving. As 
mentioned in Subsection 2.1, the 30 baht scheme was introduced in four stages. Surprisingly, there is 
no statistical difference in medical resources and socioeconomic status of living households between 
provinces of each phase. Because this situation allows us to regard the selection of the treatment as 
random, this study can avoid these three empirical problems. 
 
3 Estimation Strategy 
 
This study investigates the relationship between savings and health insurance using the theory of 
optimal choice under uncertainty, as in Chou et al. (2003). However, it should be noted that 
households balance out spending and savings to smooth consumption, which is shown in Paxson 
(1992). If savings for consumption smoothing are not separated from precautionary savings, it would 
be impossible to identify the effects of the 30 baht scheme on household savings. In this study, a 
model is used that measures precautionary savings from permanent income and consumption 
smoothing from transitory income based on the permanent income hypothesis in order to separate 
these savings. 
I assume that the savings of household i (Si) are a linear function of permanent income (YPi), 
transitory income (YTi), the income variability of the household (VARi), and the variables (Wi) that 
measure the household life-cycle stage: 
 1 2 3 4
VAR .P Ti i i i i iS Y YD D D D D H     W  (1) 
If households behave completely according to the permanent income hypothesis, the coefficient of 
permanent income (D1) should be 0 and the coefficient of transitory income (D2) should be 1. If 
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households save as a precaution, it is expected that the propensity to save out of permanent income 
(D1) is significantly positive.  
Now, we focus on the propensity to save out of permanent income (D1) in order to investigate the 
impact of the 30 baht scheme on household saving. The propensity to save out of permanent income 
(D1) decreases if precautionary savings decrease. Thus, the reason for using this method is because 
savings and the uncertainty of medical expenditure are endogenous. If out-of-pocket payments are 
exogenous, as implicitly assumed by Chou et al. (2003), we can analyze them using the variables 
related to medical expenses, as VARi. However, in Thailand, health care spending would not be 
exogenous to total household expenditure. Therefore, I suppose that precautionary savings for health 
risk are included in the savings from permanent income. 
 
3.1 Estimation framework 
Although information on permanent income and transitory income is necessary in order to estimate 
the saving function (1), it is generally unavailable. Hence, this study employs the estimation 
framework of Paxson (1992). Paxson (1992) uses a sample of farmers in Thailand to investigate 
whether households are able to balance out spending and savings in order to smooth consumption. 
She assumes that the change in annual rainfall is orthogonal to permanent income and then divides 
household income into permanent income and transitory income by assuming that the variables 
measuring the change in rainfall are instrumental variables of transitory income. 
Following this approach, we first assume that the total income of household i at time t is the sum 
of permanent income and transitory income. In other words, 
 
.P Tit it itY Y Y   (2) 
Next, we assume that permanent income is expressed as: 
 c .
P P P P P
it t it itY E E E H   X  (3) 
XPit is a vector of household characteristics that are determinants of permanent income. These 
include 15 dummy variables indicating household socioeconomic classification and the composition 
of household members in 17 age/sex/education categories. Ec represents a province fixed effect of 
households living in province c. EPt represents a year fixed effect of permanent income. HPit is a 
residual of permanent income. 
In a similar way, transitory income is defined as a linear function of XTrt, a vector of the 
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region-specific variables that are determinants of transitory income. Transitory income is expressed 
as 
 ,T T T T Tit t rt itY E E H  X  (4) 
where XTrt includes deviations from the amount of average rainfall each month and its squared. 
Ideally, it is necessary to contain the variable, such as the health conditions of household members, 
which influences a household’s transitory income in XT, but such information as sickness is not 
freely available. However, this is not a serious problem because this study focuses on the change in 
the propensity to save out of permanent income. Because the factors of unexpected income 
fluctuation are orthogonal to permanent income, the accuracy of the estimation of transitory income 
does not affect the accuracy of the estimation of permanent income. ETt represents a year effect of 
transitory income. The residual HTit includes all the transitory income of household i that is not 
explained by XTrt.  
As previously stated, Equations (3) and (4) cannot be estimated, because permanent income YPit 
and transitory income YTit cannot be observed. Then, the income equation is derived by substituting 
Equations (3) and (4) for Equation (2), and permanent income and transitory income are obtained 
based on the estimated result. Then, the income equation is expressed as 
 ,P P T Tit t c it rt itY E E E E Q    X X  (5) 
where Et = EPt + ETt. The income of household i, Yit, uses average monthly income, which is annual 
income divided by 12. 
The estimated result of income equation (5) is shown as the sum of three components, namely 
permanent income, transitory income, and unexplained income. The unexplained income is 
constructed from unestimated permanent income and unestimated transitory income, and also 
includes year fixed effect, Et, because the year fixed effect is constructed from components of 
permanent and transitory income in this study. In addition, unexplained income includes household 
fixed effects as an element of permanent income, and the health conditions of household members 
and short-term unemployment as elements of transitory income. 
The saving equation is derived from the estimation result of the income function (5). In this 
estimation, permanent income, transitory income, and unexplained income are added to the saving 
equation as an explanatory variable. As a result, the base model is shown by the following 
expressions 
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1 2
3 4 5 6
ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ VAR ,
P P T T
it t c it rt
O
t it it it r it
S
Y
D E E D E D
E Q D D D D H
ª º ª º   ¬ ¼ ¬ ¼
ª º     ¬ ¼
X X
W
 (6) 
where Dt = D + EPtD1 + ETtD2. In this study, Sit is calculated as the difference between total income 
and total expenditure. Total income is the sum of average monthly income Yit and other money 
receipts YOit. YOit is average monthly money receipts, which comprises inheritance, proceeds from 
insurance, and lottery winnings. Thus, YOit is not included in income equation (5) and is added to the 
saving equation, because YOit does not correlate with average income and does not have a reverse 
causality relationship with monthly expenditure before the investigation month. Total expenditure is 
the sum of monthly expenditure, which is deflated using the monthly consumer price index by region 
in order to adjust average monthly income and average non-consumption expenditure, such as taxes. 
The standard deviation of rainfall, VARr, is used as a proxy of income fluctuation. Observed weather 
information uses the regional variable, VARr, to become the same value by household in region r. 
 
3.2 DID approach 
This study estimates the change in the propensity to save out of permanent income using two DID 
approaches developed for the saving equation (6). The first DID approach is to compare changes in 
the propensity to save out of  permanent income between treatment and control groups. The 
beneficiaries of the 30 baht scheme are all nationals not covered by the CSMBS or the SSS. That is, 
the treatment group and control group are defined based on the eligibility of medical schemes. 
Because the CSMBS covers all family members of beneficiaries, the control group is composed of 
households in which at least one member receives the CSMBS6. The treatment group is composed of 
households in which no members receive the CSMBS or the SSS.  
A decrease in the precautionary savings of the treatment group is shown as a change in the 
coefficient of estimated permanent income, (D1), in Equation (6). Then, in order to identify the 
change in the coefficient of permanent income, permanent income and the DID term interact as per 
the following equation 
 
2
3 4 5 6 7
ˆ ˆ ˆDID
ˆ ˆ VAR Treat .
P P T T
it t c it rt
O
t it it it r it it
S
Y
D E E E D
E Q D D D D D H
ª º ª º   u ¬ ¼ ¬ ¼
ª º      ¬ ¼
X X
W
 (7) 
6 On the other hand, the SSS covers only beneficiaries and does not cover family. Then, a household 
may benefit from the 30 baht scheme as long as not all its members have joined SSS. Thus, the 
treatment and control groups do not include beneficiaries of SSS.  
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In the first DID model, 
  2004 20041 1 2 3DID Treat Treat .it it it itD DD J J J    u   
D2004 is an indicator variable for the period after the introduction of the 30 baht scheme. Treatit is an 
indicator variable for the treatment group. The other variables in Equation (7) are similar to those in 
Equation (6). The effects of the introduction of the 30 baht scheme on household savings, '30baht, can 
be expressed as follows 
  > @30baht 1 2 3 2 1 30 .J J J J J Jª º'        ¬ ¼  
This equation means that J3 is the difference between a change in the propensity to save out of 
permanent income in the treatment and control groups. If precautionary savings for a health risk of 
the treatment group decreased following the introduction of the 30 baht scheme, J3 would be 
significantly negative. 
To estimate the saving equation (7), it is necessary to develop the income equation (5) and the 
saving equation (6). There are two steps to develop the income equation (5). First, it is developed 
into a model that expresses changing income structure from 2000 to 2004. For instance, there is a 
possibility that changing income structure results in permanent income increases as a result of the 
improvement in health following the introduction of the health insurance scheme. Nevertheless, the 
DID estimator J3 might include the change in household savings, according to changing income 
structures peculiar to the treatment group, if the explicit measurement of permanent income were 
constant throughout the sample period. Then, interaction terms of the socio-economic classification 
dummy variables are made with the instrumental variables of permanent income that are included in 
XPit and the year dummy variables. Second, we consider the possibility that the influence of rainfall 
is different in the control group and in the treatment group. Ersado et al. (2003) estimate transitory 
income using the interaction terms urban area dummy and rainfall deviation from the long-range 
average in order to control for the possibility that a rainfall shock has a different influence on urban 
areas to rural areas. Many treatment group households reside in rural areas, whereas half the control 
group households reside in urban areas. Then, the interaction term of XTrt is added, as well as a 
control group dummy. 
In addition, the saving equation is developed. Consumption (savings) behavior in the life-cycle 
stage could be different for the treatment group and for the control group. For example, expenditure 
in the formal sector is higher than it is in the informal sector because formal sector workers are 
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required to demonstrate suitable levels of consumption in order to maintain their social positions. To 
control for different consumption behavior in each group, interaction terms of the variables of 
household life-cycle stage, Wit, are made with each group dummy variable. 
Furthermore, it is necessary to consider measurement error as an econometric issue. The 
household survey data on income and consumption could contain measurement errors. If so, a 
measurement error is included in the error term, Hit, and unexplained income, vit, of the savings 
function. As a result, D3 will be biased because the measurement error correlates with unexplained 
income. If the original model of Paxson (1992) is used, the coefficients of permanent income and 
transitory income are not affected measurement errors because unexplained income is orthogonal to 
permanent income and transitory income. However, the interaction term of permanent income and 
the DID term are not orthogonal to unexplained income. Thus, this study confirms the strength of the 
correlation of the interaction term and unexplained income by comparing the coefficients of 
unexplained income in the estimation result in Equations (6) and (7). 
 
3.3 Analysis exploiting the phased introduction of the 30 baht scheme 
In order to check the robustness of the first DID approach, this study additionally estimates the 
saving equation, which exploits the introduction of the 30 baht scheme in four phases, using SES 
2001. The standard SES in Thailand is constructed from data collection processes that are carried out 
every month. SES 2001 was a smaller survey than the standard SES, with data collected in February, 
March, April, July, August, and September. SES collects the information about consumption and 
income in the month (or year) before the survey. Therefore, investigations from February to April 
collected information before the introduction of the 30 baht scheme in all provinces. On the other 
hand, investigations from July to September collected information after the introduction of phases 1 
and 2 in provinces, and collected information before the introduction in other provinces. Therefore, 
this analysis examines whether the precautionary savings of households decreased in provinces 
where the 30 baht scheme was introduced in phase 1 or phase 2. 
The following DID term is used with Equation (7), 
 
2 3 4 5 6 7
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ VAR Treat ,
P P
im m c im
T T O
rm m im im im r c i
S DID
Y
D E E
E D E Q D D D D D H
ª º c  ¬ ¼
ª º ª º       ¬ ¼ ¬ ¼
X
X W
  
  1 1 2 3DID Treat Treat .After Afterc cD DD J J Jc     u   
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where Treatc is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the household lived in province c, which 
introduced the 30 baht scheme in phase 1 or phase 2, and 0 otherwise. DAfter is a dummy variable for 
the period after the introduction of the 30 baht scheme introduced in phase 1 or phase 2, that is, the 
household was investigated after August. If households undertake precautionary savings in provinces 
in which phases 1 or 2 is introduced, it is expected that J will be negative. The fixed effects of the 
investigation month, Dm, are added in order to control for the seasonality of expenditure because the 
analysis focuses on the change in monthly savings behavior. 
The second DID approach focuses on the 30 baht scheme introduced in provinces, compared 
with the first DID approach that focuses on individual eligibility of the scheme. There is a possibility 
that in the second approach, many households included in the treatment grouphad not yet registered 
for the 30 baht scheme, since immediately after the introduction. In addition, if households do not 
trust the sustainability and effectiveness of the 30 baht scheme, household saving behavior would 
not change much immediately after the introduction. For these reasons, it is expected that the 
magnitude of the second DID estimator, J, becomes smaller than that of the results of the first DID 
estimator. 
 
4 Data 
4.1 SES data  
This study uses three types of data sets in order to undertake the estimation. The first data sets are 
SES2000, SES2001, and SES2004, which collect detailed socioeconomic information on households, 
such as income, expenditure, and members’ characteristics, such as age, sex, occupation, and 
educational attainment. SES collects information by two-stage stratified sampling and reports a 
national representative household’s sampling weight. All the descriptive statistics and estimation 
results of this study are the values that are considered as survey design. Household panel data cannot 
be constructed because SES is a cross-sectional survey. 
The most important point to enable analysis is the availability of detailed individual information 
on medical scheme coverage. Generally, it is difficult to know what kinds of insurance one receives. 
To make matters worse, in the case of Thailand, health scheme eligibility is determined in principle 
by individual occupation but exceptional cases exist. For example, 24.5% of civil servants do not 
receive CSMBS; on the other hand, 10.5% of non-civil servants receive CSMBS in 2004. If we 
simply assign to the control group and the treatment group individuals according to work status, one 
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who does not receive the 30 baht scheme is included in the treatment group and one who receives the 
30 baht scheme is included in the control group. If this group misassignment is not solved, the effect 
of the 30 baht scheme is underestimated. 
Fortunately, we can identify one’s medical insurance scheme because this information is reported 
in SES 2004. However, SESS2000 and SES2001 do not collect this information. Thus, as a first step, 
the probability of individuals receiving the CSMBS or the SSS in each occupational status is 
estimated using SES 20047. Next, based on the estimator in the first step, the probability of 
individuals receiving any medical scheme is calculated in SES 2000 and SES 2001. Finally, the 
control group and the treatment group are defined on the basis of the predicted value. The treatment 
group comprises people who have a probability of receiving CSMBS or SSS of less than 10% and 
none have a civil servant in their family. The control group comprises people with at least one person 
in the family who is a civil servant or has a probability of receiving CSMBS of more than 90%. By 
this sample selection, the proportion of CSMBS beneficiaries who are included in the treatment 
group becomes 3.5% and the proportion of non-beneficiaries of CSMBS who are included in the 
control group becomes 3.24% in the individual level dataset of SES2004. 
 
4.2 Inflation bias 
Household savings are measured as the difference between total income and total expenditure 
because SES does not ask direct questions about savings. However, reported household income is 
the average monthly income that is based on income during the year or month before the 
investigation, whereas household expenditure is a value based on expenditure during the month 
before the investigation added to the other average monthly expenditure led by annual costs, such as 
tax. If there is inflation over the survey year, savings would have a downward bias (Paxson, 1992). 
Using the monthly consumer price index as the second data set, this study adjusts for inflation bias in 
a manner similar to Paxson (1992)8. 
 
4.3 Constructing the rainfall variable 
7 The reason for estimating the receiving probability of health scheme by each classification is to 
improve the estimation accuracy. For example, there are many recipients of SSS at a specific 
occupational classification, and there is an occupational classification that is often live with civil 
servants. As explanatory variables for the prediction, occupation, age, area of residence, gender, and 
the number of civil servants within the family are used. 
8 Monthly consumer price index by region can be downloaded from the homepage of the Thai Bureau of Trade and 
Economic Indices (as of May 25, 2009). 
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In order to construct the rainfall variable, this study uses daily rainfall data derived from 
meteorological observatories across the whole country. The National Climate Data Center releases 
observed meteorological data every day on more than 20,000 observatories in many parts of the 
world9. In Thailand, there are 114 meteorological observatories where observation data have been 
collected from 1973 to 200410. However, owing to data limitations for some observatories, in this 
study, we use weather data observed in 52 weather stations and their geolocations. These weather 
stations are distributed uniformly across Thailand, as shown in Figure 1. 
Households are matched to these 52 weather stations by choosing the station closest to the gravity 
point of the province in which the household resides. SES collects the residential information and the 
National Climate Data Center data includes the latitude and longitude of weather stations. ArcGIS 
allows us to calculate the gravity point of the province in order to find the closest weather station. 
The variables, XTrt and VARr, are constructed based on this rainfall information. 
XTrt represents transitory income. If deviation from the average rainfall were serially correlated, 
XTrt would be inappropriate as an instrument of transitory income because one can expect the value 
of rainfall. The Portmanteau test shows that deviation from the average rainfall in almost all months 
of all weather stations follows a white noise process.  
  
4.4 Sample 
Table 2 shows the summary statistics of observations used for the first DID estimation11. Panel A 
reports the summary statistics of the sample of the first DID estimation. The average monthly 
income of the treatment group is 7,015 baht in 2000 and 8,279 baht in 2004. The average income per 
capita of the treatment group is about 67 baht per day in 2000 and 80 baht per day in 2004 
(approximately 2–3 dollars). Although Thailand is classified as a lower middle-income country by 
the World Bank, the living standards of the treatment group are not expected to be high. In contrast, 
the average monthly income of the control group is more than four times that of the treatment group.  
The treatment group is constructed from four subgroups based on a socioeconomic classification 
of the SES, namely farmers, economically inactive households, production/construction worker 
9 National Climate Data Center Online: http://lwf.ncdc.noaa.gov/cgi-bin/res40.pl?page=gsod.html (accessed January 
14, 2009). 
10 Because only seven weather stations show weather information from 1966 to 1972, observation data after 1973 are 
used. 
11 In order to remove outliers, the observations of the top 1% of income and expenditure are dropped. The estimation 
results are almost the same when the top 0.5% is dropped, or when the top 2% is dropped.  
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households, and other households12. The features of each subgroup are summarized as follows. 
Although the average monthly income of farmers is similar to that of economically inactive 
households or production/construction workers’ households (See Table 2), farmers are more affected 
by the weather, and therefore, face strong seasonality in comparison with the other subgroups 
(Paxson, 1993). Income seasonality increases the incentive to treat diseases in farming seasons 
because farming is labor-intensive work, and thus, health-intensive work. Behrman and Deolalikar 
(1989) show that farmers’ short-run health conditions during the farming season affect their labor 
productivity. The rate of return on health investment in the farming season is high. Therefore, 
farmers could have stronger precautionary savings motives against health risks than other groups. 
The economically inactive households depend on remittances. If remittances play the role of 
insurance, economically inactive households that depend on remittances might have weak 
precautionary motives (Yang and Choi, 2007). Conversely, it is possible that to be dependent on 
remittances leads to greater economic uncertainty because the remitter may be poor to begin with. 
Returns on health investment as labor income should be lower than other sub-groups if households 
depend on remittances but the ratio of medical expenditure to income is relatively higher. The 
precautionary saving motive of the economically inactive households might be strong.  
On the other hand, it is possible that precautionary savings have not been reduced by the 
introduction of the 30 baht scheme for households that cannot be satisfied with the medical services 
available under the scheme. The scheme decreases unpredictable medical expenditure only if a 
beneficiary visits a primary care unit that has registered each person. In addition, the 30 baht scheme 
does not apply if a beneficiary wants to receive a medical service in a medical institution other than a 
primary care unit. The medical expenditure and income of the entrepreneur, trade, and industry 
household is the highest in the treatment subgroup. It is possible that their health investment 
preference differs from other treatment subgroup households.  
In Table 2, panel B provides descriptive statistics of household medical expenditure. This is 
constructed from expenditure for medical supplies, outpatient fees, and inpatient fees. The samples 
of each group are conditional on a positive level of medical expenditure for each household and this 
accounts for between 58.8% and 71.3% of the observations of each group in panel A. Table 2 allows 
us to compare the ratio of medical expenditure in household income in 2000 with that in 2004. In all 
treatment subgroups, this ratio following the introduction of the 30 baht scheme decreases 
12 There are other socioeconomic classifications of beneficiary households (e.g., forestry, fishers, and unpaid 
workers). However, only about 3% of the total samples belong to these classifications. 
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statistically significantly at the 5% level. Furthermore, the observation ratio of panel B to panel A  
not only tends to decrease, the standard deviation of the ratio of medical expenditure in household 
income in all groups also decreases. These statistics suggest that the uncertainty of medical 
expenditure decreases in the treatment group. By contrast, the ratio of medical expenditure to income 
for the control group does not change.  
Table 3 compares some features of provinces in which the 30 baht scheme was introduced in 
phases 1 and 2 and provinces in which it was introduced in phases 3 and 4. This is because we define 
provinces in which it was introduced in  phases 1 or 2 as the treatment group, and provinces in 
which it was introduced in phases 3 or 4 as the control group in the second DID estimation. This 
table reports household attributes using SES2000 in panels A and B, and health resources of 
provinces using Thai public health (2002) in panel C. Column (1) reports summary statistics of the 
treatment group. Column (2) reports summary statistics of the control group. Column (3) reports the 
differences between treatment group provinces and control group provinces. 
Because a phased introduction does not mean random assignment in general, the second DID 
estimation does not necessarily meet DID assumptions directly. Moreover, in developing countries, it 
is very rare for a phased introduction to be regarded as a random assignment. However, surprisingly, 
Table 3 shows balance between the treatment and control groups in terms of household status and 
health resources in province䡏13. Household income is statistically significant at the10% level. The 
reason why differences in income are statistically significant is that phase 3 and 4 provinces include 
the Bangkok metropolitan area. This significant difference is lost if households that live in Bangkok 
are removed from phases 3 and 4. In other statistics, the control group and treatment groups are 
balanced, even if Bangkok is included. 
 
5 Empirical results 
5.1 First DID estimation: using eligibility of health schemes 
Table 4 shows the estimation results for the second stage of the first DID estimation. The first stage 
estimation results are shown in Appendix Table A.1. Column (1) shows the estimates of the saving 
function (7), which is the base model, column (2) shows the estimates of the saving function (8), 
which is the DID model, and column (3) shows the estimates of the saving function (7) using only a 
sample of the treatment group. The DID estimator, J3, reported in column (2), is not significantly 
13 More surprisingly, phase 1, 2, and 3 provinces are perfectly balanced in each. Phase 4 provinces 
are not balanced because the phase includes only richer areas of Bangkok. 
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negative. Thus, the introduction of the 30 baht scheme does not decrease the marginal propensity of 
the treatment group to save from permanent income. 
The interaction terms of the DID term and permanent income may be orthogonal to unexplained 
income because the difference between the coefficients of unexplained income, D3, in the base model 
(1) and in the DID model (3) are not statistically significant. As a result, we can ignore the 
correlation between the measurement error included in the error term and the interaction term of the 
DID term and permanent income. 
 
Subgroups 
The saving equation (7) is estimated for every subgroup in order to consider the possibility that 
the precautionary savings motive is different according to socioeconomic background. Table 5 
presents the estimation results of each subgroup. The DID estimators are significantly negative in all 
subgroups without entrepreneurs, trade, and industry households. The magnitude of the significant 
coefficient is large. This indicates that the savings propensity of permanent income decreases from 
about 14% to 17%. This decrease accounts for between about 24% and 30% of the propensity to 
save out of permanent income in 2004. As stated previously in Subsection 2.2, the possibility that 
these estimators are biased cannot be denied because although DID estimation assumes common 
trends of the treatment and control groups, this assumption is not met. However, I believe that this 
bias is not large because the estimator of each subgroup is different, despite using the same control 
group in each estimation14. 
This result suggests that the 30 baht scheme has not only reduced the risk of catastrophic payment 
of out-of-pocket payments, but also reduced the motivation for precautionary savings to the health 
risk of households that are not rich among the beneficiaries. In other words, even poor households 
lower their living standards significantly in order to save as a precaution for health risk. The result 
that the effects of the 30 baht scheme are greater for poor households is consistent with the 
conclusion of Gruber et al., (2012), who show that the effect of the 30 baht scheme is greater in areas 
with a high subscriber ratio for MWS, which covers mainly poor households. 
 
5.2 Second DID estimation: exploiting the phased introduction of the 30baht scheme 
14 The results in Table 5 may appear to be not consistent with the result in Table 4. This is probably 
because the estimated income function in the first stage is not well captured the differences in 
income structure between sub-groups. 
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As a robustness check for the first DID approach, the second DID approach, which exploits the 
phased introduction, is analyzed. The second DID approach defines the treatment and control groups 
depending on whether the 30 baht scheme was introduced in a household in a province in which the 
scheme was introduced the month before the investigation. Thus, households that were not registered 
in the 30 baht scheme at the time of investigation are also included in the treatment group. In 
addition, because immediately after the introduction of the 30 baht scheme, it is also possible that 
savings behavior of households has not yet changed. That is, the DID estimator of the second 
approach should be smaller than that of the first approach.  
Table 6 reports the results of the second DID approach. According to the results for the whole 
sample, namely, column (1) of Table 6, the coefficient J indicates that the effect of the introduction 
of the 30 baht scheme on household savings is statistically insignificant, which is the same as the 
first DID approach. According to the results for each subgroup, shown in columns (2) – (5), DID 
estimators, J, are almost consistent with the results in Table 5. In addition, the magnitude of the DID 
estimator of most groups is smaller than the first DID estimators in Table 5. The estimators of (3) 
Entrepreneurs, trade, and industry households and (5) Economically inactive households are 
significantly negative. The result that the estimator of (3) is significantly negative differs from the 
result of Table 5; however, this is not a great inconsistentcy because the magnitude of the estimators 
implies that savings from permanent income reduce by only 1.9%. Furthermore, the DID estimator 
of (2) Farmer and (4) Other work status households is negative but insignificant. The reason why the 
estimator of column (4) is not significant could be that the fit of the estimation model is poor. 
This discussion is necessary because the estimator of column (2) seems to differ from the result in 
Table 5. The magnitude of the coefficient is as expected, but it is not statistically significant. I 
believe that this is due to the income seasonality of farmers. As discussed carefully in Paxson (1992, 
1993), farmers faces income seasonality in Thailand. As discussed in Subsection 4.4, because of 
income seasonality, farmers have stronger motives to make precautionary savings for health risk than 
other groups. Immediately after the introduction of the 30 baht scheme, effects that weakens the 
precautionary motive do not appear because the 30 baht scheme has not spread fully across Thailand. 
These results are not inconsistent with those in Table 5. 
 
6 Conclusion 
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This study provides the first evidence for the effect of the introduction of health insurance schemes 
on household precautionary savings in a developing country. The presented estimation results 
suggest that the savings behavior of many beneficiaries of Thailand’s 30 baht scheme does not 
change following its introduction. However, in the results of the analysis of four subgroups, it was 
confirmed that household precautionary savings is reduced in all subgroups except the richest. Based 
on the result that compares the propensity to save in 2000 and 2004 using simple DID analysis, the 
study found that the propensity to save out of permanent income decreased from about 14%–17%. 
This decrease accounts for 24%–30% of the propensity to save out of permanent income in 2004. In 
addition, based on the result of more rigorous DID analysis, the study found that the propensity to 
save out of permanent income is reduced in spite of immediately after introduction of the 30 baht 
scheme. This means that even poor households have greatly reduced levels of permanent 
consumption, in order to prepare for an unpredictable health risk.  
These results imply two things about the effect of the introduction of the 30 baht scheme. First, it 
not only improves health utilization and reduces household medical expenditure, but it also improves 
household living standards in the informal sector. Second, the security of the 30 baht scheme may 
not be sufficient because the effect of the 30 baht scheme on the richer treatment subgroup is small. 
What is important to note is that the 30 baht scheme has improved greatly the living standard of the 
informal sector, even if it does not provide enough security. 
The results of this study suggest that poor households not only become ill more easily than rich 
households but also cut down their permanent living standards to prepare for unpredictable health 
risk. To deal with such a situation, in Thailand, the 30 baht scheme was introduced. It has improved 
the living standards of beneficiary households by decreasing precautionary savings, and it may have 
improved the health conditions of household members by increasing opportunities to treat diseases. 
 
Appendix A: Constructing the rainfall variable 
The weather information observed in Thailand has two types of missing data: a lack of observation 
days and a lack of rainfall data on rainy days. Because monthly rainfall data are constructed from a 
summation of daily rainfall data, monthly rainfall variables have a downward bias if observation 
days during a month are missing. Moreover, if rainfall data on rainy days are missing, monthly 
rainfall variables can easily become biased for any reason (e.g., instrument failure owing to bad 
weather). Because observation information is likely to be missing the older it becomes, the average 
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monthly rainfall data derived from data from 1973 to 2004 could be lower than its true value. In 
other words, deviations from the amount of average rainfall, XTrt, could have a large bias, probably 
upward, in the weather station when there has been a lot of missing data in the past. To make matters 
worse, the tendency for weather information to be lacking is different for each weather station. 
First, the problem of this lack of daily information is solved. As mentioned in Section 4, there are 
114 weather stations and 76 provinces in Thailand; therefore, the weather stations are distributed 
densely. For days when there were no observations at each weather station during 1973 to 2004, I 
complement the weather information with the observation from the nearest weather station. 
Next, the problem of the lack of rainfall data on rainy days is solved. When rainfall cannot be used, 
the information remains available (e.g., observation day, mean temperature, mean dew point, and 
mean sea level pressure). First, I sort out only the information on rainy days from 1973 to 2004 and 
estimate a simple linear model with rainfall as an explained variable. Then, I predict unobservable 
rainfall and complement it. 
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Table 1: Health Insurance Coverage (percentage)
1998 2001 2003 2006
30 baht - - 74.7 74.3
MWS 45.1 32.4 - -
CSBMS 10.8 8.5 8.9 8.0
SSS 8.5 7.2 9.6 11.4
VHCS 13.9 20.8 - -
Private health insurance 2.0 2.1 1.7 2.3
Total insured 80.3 71.0 94.9 96.0
Uninsured 19.7 29.0 5.1 4.0
Sources: Wibulpolprasert and Thaiprayoon (2008)
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Table 2: Summary Statistics (weighted)
Variable Pre 30 Baht Post 30 Baht Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
Panel A
Attributes of household
Income (baht) 7015 8279 5599 7791 11638 12950 4976 6049 6901 6508 33380 35346
(6030) (6511) (4566) (5779) (7833) (8277) (2991) (3514) (6111) (5534) (21056) (21088)
Savings 489 2810 21 2802 1719 4531 0 1485 619 2397 10041 14464
(4365) (4936) (3930) (4822) (5584) (6499) (2498) (2752) (5058) (4473) (13406) (16641)
  Savings/Income -0.157 0.242 -0.241 0.239 -0.005 0.254 -0.144 0.199 -0.172 0.284 0.245 0.357
(0.729) (0.559) (0.710) (0.608) (0.585) (0.509) (0.582) (0.432) (1.037) (0.635) (0.430) (0.360)
Medical Expenditure 154 137 137 128 220 194 113 96 159 135 584 572
(441) (503) (437) (466) (544) (631) (271) (453) (464) (455) (1676) (1833)
The ratio of medical expenditure to income 0.027 0.018 0.028 0.019 0.023 0.015 0.026 0.016 0.029 0.023 0.018 0.017
(0.072) (0.054) (0.075) (0.061) (0.067) (0.039) (0.069) (0.046) (0.073) (0.063) (0.089) (0.044)
Sex of head(proprtion of men) 0.787 0.724 0.89 0.83 0.77 0.72 0.80 0.76 0.52 0.49 0.75 0.74
Age of head 44.6 48.3 45.5 49.3 43.4 45.3 44.2 46.1 44.3 52.1 48.0 49.3
Household size 3.5 3.3 3.8 3.7 3.4 3.2 3.5 3.5 2.9 2.7 3.7 3.5
Number of observations 7907 11290 2423 3252 2694 3723 1580 2434 1210 1881 2339 3289
Panel B : Conditional on a positive level of medical expenditure
Medical Expenditure 217 200 188 179 314 290 156 139 243 213 917 973
(510) (597) (502) (543) (628) (753) (308) (539) (555) (558) (2027) (2308)
The ratio of medical expenditure to income 0.038 0.027 0.038 0.026 0.033 0.023 0.036 0.024 0.044 0.037 0.028 0.028
(0.083) (0.064) (0.086) (0.071) (0.078) (0.046) (0.079) (0.053) (0.086) (0.076) (0.110) (0.055)
Number of Observations 5465 7437 1727 2274 1845 2416 1123 1603 770 1144 1491 1934
Observations ratio* 0.691 0.659 0.713 0.699 0.685 0.649 0.711 0.659 0.636 0.608 0.637 0.588
Notes:  Observations ratio is the ratio of N of observations in Panel B to N of observations in Panel A. Standard deviation corresponding survery design is reported in parentheses.
Treatment Group Control Group
Treatment Group(Subroup)
Farmer
Entrepreneurs, trade
and industry
Other work status
Economically inactive
households
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Table 3: Treatment group's summary statistics by pahsed group in 2000
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Coef. P-value
Panel A: Attributes of household (weighted)
Income (baht) 6478 5398 7059 6077 -581 0.079 *
Savings 264.2 4074 507.0 4388 -242.8 0.298
Observations
Panel B: Medical expenditure of household conditioning on positive medical exp.(weighted)
Medical Expenditure 221.7 497 216.4 511 5.3 0.870
The ratio of medical expenditure to income 0.033 0.053 0.038 0.084 -0.005 0.144
Observations
Panel C: Average Health Resources of Provinces 
Number of population/physician 6251 4334 6918 3516 -666 0.523
Number of hospitals 16.2 8.8 17.4 18.5 -1.14 0.721
Number of population/patient bed 531 228 607 232 -76.4 0.191
Number of new out-patients 366082 188576 396982 505228 -30900 0.703
Number of in-patients 100744 59847 105838 147413 -5094 0.833
Observations
Notes : The differences are estimated by regresstion. In panel A and panel B, P-values are calclated corresponding to the
survey design. * indicates statistically significant at the 10% level, ** indicates statistically significant at the 5% level, ***
indicates statistically significant at the 1%level.
76
Difference
7907
5465
Phase 3&4Pahse 1&2
23 53
411
644 7263
5054
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 Table 4: Key Estimates of Saving Equation (weighted)
Bootstrap Bootstrap Bootstrap
Std. Err. Std. Err. Std. Err.
YP (D 1) 0.452 (0.017) *** 0.463 (0.038) *** 0.327 (0.014) ***
YP!2004dummy (J 1) 0.071 (0.028) ** 0.101 (0.018) ***
YP!Treatment group (J 2) -0.126 (0.042) ***
YP!(Treatment group!2004dummy) (J 3) 0.024 (0.038)
YT (D 2) 0.386 (0.060) *** 0.466 (0.059) *** 0.397 (0.062) ***
YU (D 3) 0.587 (0.019) *** 0.582 (0.019) *** 0.680 (0.010) ***
YO(D 4) 0.404 (0.108) *** 0.417 (0.106) *** 0.431 (0.123) **
2004dummy 1706.7 (88.1) *** 1836.5 (116.5) *** 1845.8 (114.8) ***
Treatment Group Dummy -230.0 (864.8) 111.7 (850.7)
Treatment group!2004dummy
Constant -1963.0 (990.2) ** -3181.6 (1052.1) *** -4473.0 (257.1) ***
R2
N
Notes䠖Results show regresstion coefficients after controling for standerd deviatoin of rainfall by month, and life-cycle factor constructed from
five categories by age by treatment and conrol group. Linearlized standard error corresponding survery design and bootstrapped standard errors
are reported in parentheses. * indicates statistically significant at the 10% level, ** indicates statistically significant at the 5% level, *** indicates
statistically significant at the 1%level.
19197
Variable
Coef. Coef. Coef.
(1) Base Model (2) DID  (3) Only treatment group
0.627 0.631 0.624
24825
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Table 5: Key Estimates of Saving Equation : Subgroup (weighted)
 
Bootstrap Bootstrap Bootstrap Bootstrap
Std. Err. Std. Err. Std. Err. Std. Err.
YP (D 1) 0.429 (0.044) *** 0.452 (0.038) *** 0.438 (0.039) *** 0.444 (0.042) ***
YP!2004dummy (J 1) 0.129 (0.047) *** 0.090 (0.028) *** 0.133 (0.048) *** 0.119 (0.048) **
YP!Treatment group (J 2) 0.082 (0.054) -0.083 (0.044) * -0.004 (0.045) 0.003 (0.035)
YP!(Treatment group!2004dummy) (J 3) -0.155 (0.066) ** 0.044 (0.036) -0.139 (0.066) ** -0.167 (0.058) ***
YT (D 2) 0.401 (0.065) *** 0.521 (0.071) *** 0.390 (0.076) *** 0.512 (0.073) ***
YU (D 3) 0.567 (0.024) *** 0.550 (0.020) *** 0.528 (0.025) *** 0.545 (0.025) ***
YO(D 4) 0.167 (0.101) * 0.585 (0.148) *** 0.241 (0.126) * 0.292 (0.130) **
2004dummy 2241.4 (659.7) *** 1604.6 (192.1) *** 1854.1 (653.2) *** 3627.5 (905.5) ***
Treatment Group Dummy 1847.0 (744.8) ** 867.8 (780.7) 683.1 (964.8) 1044.6 (768.8)
Constant -4221.7 (1360.0) *** -3550.2 (1162.0) *** -3697.9 (1458.9) ** -5132.7 (1629.1) ***
R2
N
Economically inactive
households
Variable
Farmer
Entrepreneurs, trade and
industry
Other work status
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
0.631 0.591 0.618 0.604
Notes䠖Results show regresstion coefficients after controling for standerd deviatoin of rainfall by month, and life-cycle factor constructed from five categories by age by treatment
and conrol group. Linearlized standard error corresponding survery design and bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses. * indicates statistically significant at the
10% level, ** indicates statistically significant at the 5% level, *** indicates statistically significant at the 1%level.
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Table 6: Key Estimates of Saving Equation (8) (weighted)
Bootstrap Linearized Linearized Linearized Linearized
Std. Err. Std. Err. Std. Err. Std. Err. Std. Err.
YP (D 1) 0.403 (0.027) *** 0.639 (0.039) *** 0.450 (0.050) *** 0.257 (0.065) *** 0.531 (0.090) ***
YP!Post 30 baht (J 1) -0.002 (0.006) -0.020 (0.035) 0.003 (0.005) 0.002 (0.001) 0.007 (0.007)
YP!Treatment group (J 2) -0.020 (0.015) -0.003 (0.048) 0.003 (0.006) 0.002 (0.002) 0.001 (0.009)
YP!Treatment group
    !Post 30 baht (J 3)
-0.010 (0.018) -0.002 (0.051) -0.016 (0.008) ** -0.003 (0.003) -0.020 (0.012) *
YT (D 2) 0.392 (0.026) *** 0.753 (0.044) *** 0.453 (0.050) *** 0.258 (0.065) *** 0.529 (0.087) ***
YU (D 3) 0.691 (0.020) *** 0.786 (0.022) *** 0.639 (0.032) *** 0.503 (0.063) *** 0.674 (0.056) ***
YO(D 4) 0.216 (0.142) -0.352 (0.279) 0.384 (0.196) * 0.410 (0.177) ** 0.127 (0.247)
Treatment Group Dummy 251.1 (186.7) 279.4 (312.2) 6.4 (494.1) 24.2 (236.8) 435.2 (399.3)
Constant -323 (456) -2913 (857) *** 4345 (1605) *** -11156 (3896) *** 1719 (1981)
R2
N
(4) Other work status
(5) Economically inactive
households
0.614 0.700 0.592 0.257 0.658
Notes䠖Results show regresstion coefficients after controling for standerd deviatoin of rainfall by month, life-cycle factor constructed from five categories by age by treatment and conrol
group, and month dummy variables. Bootsrap standard error corresponding survery design and bootstrapped standard errors are reported in collumn (1) in parentheses. Linearlized standard
error corrected for ckustering at primary sanmpling unit and sampling weight are reported in parentheses. Because there are some stratum with single sampling unit, linearized standerd error
corresponding survery design can not calculate. As result, reporeted stander error is smaller than the corrected value. However, I think it does not matter enough to affect the inrerpretaion of
the results. I check in the estimation of Table 5 on this issue, because it underestimate about 7%. * indicates statistically significant at the 10% level, ** indicates statistically significant at the
5% level, *** indicates statistically significant at the 1%level.
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
4088 1382 1276 809 621
Variable
Sub-group
(1) Treatment Group
(2) Farmer
(3) Entrepreneurs, trade
and industry
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 Figure 1: Weather Stations in Thailand 
 
30 
 
  
Table A.1.:䚷Key Estimates of Income Equation (weighted)
Linearized Linearized
Std. Err. Std. Err.
Farmer mainly owning land
     less than 2 rai -3082.8 (685.3) *** 14212.1 (3708.0) ***
䚷䚷2‒4 rai -3949.8 (348.1) *** - - -
䚷䚷5–9 rai -3715.5 (286.2) *** 33843.5 (2645.9) ***
䚷䚷10–19 rai -2967.2 (288.3) *** 24871.1 (2035.4) ***
䚷䚷20–39 rai -1784.5 (356.6) *** 30845.9 (11012.4) ***
䚷䚷40 rai or more 1884.8 (817.5) ** 32683.5 (8849.7) ***
Farmer mainly renting land
䚷䚷less than 5 rai -3654.8 (773.2) *** - - -
䚷䚷5–19 rai -3570.3 (329.5) *** - - -
䚷䚷20 rai or more -1894.9 (477.6) *** -4163.0 (2858.7)
Entrepreneurs, trade and industry
䚷䚷With paid workers 5737.4 (700.2) *** 17064.4 (4976.4) ***
䚷䚷Without paid workers 9771.1 (2936.7) ***
Other work status
䚷䚷Employed by others -1487.1 (738.3) ** 11585.6 (1378.9) ***
䚷䚷Farm workers -3500.8 (267.3) *** 1729.9 (2276.8)
䚷䚷Clerical, sales & Services workers -2324.1 (411.3) *** 5795.0 (2004.3) ***
䚷䚷Production & Construction workers -2204.1 (293.2) *** 6759.3 (3084.9) **
Economically inactive households
䚷䚷Receiving assistance or pensions -1078.9 (334.1) *** 22682.4 (7334.3) ***
Farmer mainly owning land
     less than 2 rai -1752.8 (651.0) ** 5559.2 (6904.3)
䚷䚷2‒4 rai -3661.7 (447.6) *** - - -
䚷䚷5–9 rai -3435.9 (289.8) *** 9651.4 (3651.3) ***
䚷䚷10–19 rai -2788.6 (283.5) *** 11905.1 (1789.3) ***
䚷䚷20–39 rai -1136.7 (319.9) *** 6390.8 (5480.5)
䚷䚷40 rai or more 1378.7 (497.0) *** 13595.4 (6459.2) **
Farmer mainly renting land
䚷䚷less than 5 rai -3891.4 (476.1) *** - - -
䚷䚷5–19 rai -3276.6 (373.4) *** - - -
䚷䚷20 rai or more -628.1 (532.6) - - -
Entrepreneurs, trade and industry
䚷䚷With paid workers 5913.5 (652.8) *** 26084.1 (4517.9) ***
䚷䚷Without paid workers 12038.5 (4047.9) ***
Other work status
䚷䚷Employed by others -2204.8 (479.0) *** 18706.7 (1491.8) ***
䚷䚷Farm workers -4186.3 (226.2) *** 52.9 (3463.1)
䚷䚷Clerical, sales & Services workers -2879.3 (428.1) *** 11014.4 (1925.3) ***
䚷䚷Production & Construction workers -2966.0 (241.4) *** 9598.9 (2634.1) ***
Economically inactive households
䚷䚷Receiving assistance or pensions -1807.0 (285.4) *** 30708.6 (3545.7) ***
Age × Sex × Education (?? categolies)
Rainfall (deviation)
Rainfall  ×Control group dummy
Province fixed effects
Year Dummy (2000 = 0, 2004 = 1) 1053.3 (353.7) ***
Contstant 11636.4 (725.5) ***
R2
N
Notes䠖Linearlized standard error corresponding survery design is reported in parentheses.  * indicates statistically
significant at the 10% level, ** indicates statistically significant at the 5% level, *** indicates statistically significant at the
1%level.
䕿
䕿
0.660
24825
䕿
䕿
Coef.
Treatment Group Control Group
Coef.
Socio-economic Classification dummy ! year dummy 2000
Socio-economic Classification dummy ! year dummy 2004
!"#$%&'(%)(*+$,
Variable
Base case
Base case
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